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Every security analysis of quantum key distribution (QKD) relies on a faithful modeling of the
employed quantum states. Many photon sources, like for instance a parametric down conversion
(PDC) source, require a multi-mode description, but are usually only considered in a single-mode
representation. In general, the important claim in decoy-based QKD protocols for indistinguisha-
bility between signal and decoy states does not hold for all sources. We derive new bounds on the
single photon transmission probability and error rate for multi-mode states, and apply these bounds
to the output state of a PDC source. We observe two opposing effects on the secure key rate.
First, the multi-mode structure of the state gives rise to a new attack that decreases the key rate.
Second, more contributing modes change the photon number distribution from a thermal towards
a Poissonian distribution, which increases the key rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of classical cryptography is based on the
high computational complexity of the decryption process
combined with the condition that the adversary only has
a limited amount of computational power. In contrast,
quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties, Al-
ice and Bob, to share a secret key that is inaccessible to
an eavesdropper Eve whose power is only limited by the
laws of quantum physics. In 1984, Bennett and Brassard
introduced the first QKD protocol BB84 [1]. It is still
the most commonly used protocol, although many more
have been proposed since then [2, 3, 4].
This first theoretical proposal assumed perfect devices,
namely single-photon sources and error-free transmission
and detection. With the development of sophisticated se-
curity proofs, these restrictions could gradually be less-
ened. First, security has been proved in the presence of
noise [5, 6]. In the next step, the necessity of single-
photon sources has been taken out of the equation [7].
This, however, reduced the achievable key rate drasti-
cally, because multiphoton events give rise to the photon
number splitting (PNS) attack [8, 9, 10], which Alice and
Bob cannot distinguish from natural losses.
This issue can be resolved with the decoy method,
which was introduced by Hwang [11], and has been fur-
ther developed to a practically realizable form by several
researchers [12, 13, 14]. In this method, additional decoy
states with a different photon number distribution than
the primary signal states are randomly introduced. It is
crucial that decoy states share all other physical char-
acteristics of the signal so that Eve cannot distinguish
between decoy and signal. Consequently, the decoys are
affected by the PNS attack in the same way as the sig-
nal states, and this perturbation of the system reveals
Eve’s presence. Since Eve has to design her attack in
a way that cannot be detected by Alice and Bob (oth-
erwise the protocol is aborted), her attack possibilities
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are drastically limited when she is confronted with a de-
coy protocol. This enables Alice and Bob to achieve an
improved key rate.
The important assumption that Eve cannot distinguish
between photons arising from signal and decoy states is
trivially fulfilled for a single-mode description where all
photons are created by the same creation operator. How-
ever, this model does not match experimental reality well.
Hence, in this paper, we treat the scenario where photons
are excited into many different modes and the excitation
probability for each mode differs between signal and de-
coy states. This multi-mode description is, for instance,
necessary for a realistic representation of the states cre-
ated by a parametric down conversion (PDC) source, in
which case the different modes correspond to different
spectral modes [15].
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we re-
view the decoy method and introduce the notation nec-
essary for the subsequent analysis. Sec. III presents the
description of a multi-mode state with special emphasis
on spectral modes for the description of a PDC state.
In Sec. IV and V, we describe new attack possibilities
when multi-mode states are used and derive new bounds
that allow us to calculate the achievable key rate in this
scenario. Sec. VI finally applies the analysis to the multi-
mode PDC state and gives new bounds on the achievable
key rate.
II. DECOY METHOD
The security of BB84 is based on the no-cloning the-
orem [16], which prevents Eve from making a copy of a
transmitted single photon. However, the security argu-
ment is not applicable to multiphoton events, because for
these events Alice implicitly encodes the same informa-
tion on all photons in the pulse. This, in turn, allows Eve
to obtain an identical copy of Bob’s state by splitting
away one of the photons. Hence only detection events
arising from single photons give a positive contribution
to the secure key rate. With current technology, Alice is
not able to determine the number of photons her source
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2emitted. Thus Alice and Bob cannot simply ignore mul-
tiphoton events. In this scenario, a lower bound on the
secure key rate S is given by [7, 12]
S ≥ q
[
Y
(s)
1 p
(s)
1
(
1−H(e(s)1 )
)
−Q(s)f(E(s))H(E(s))
]
.
(1)
Here p(s)n (n ∈ N0) denotes the photon number distri-
bution of Alice’s source, f(E(s)) is the error correction
efficiency, H(x) = −x log(x) − (1 − x) log(1 − x) is the
binary Shannon entropy and q accounts for incompatible
basis choices of Alice and Bob. In the standard BB84
protocol, q = 1/2. The overall detection probability is
given by the gain
Q(s) = Y0p
(s)
0 + Y
(s)
1 p
(s)
1 + Y
(s)
M p
(s)
M , (2)
where the yields Y (s)0 , Y
(s)
1 and Y
(s)
M are the detector click
probabilities conditioned on emitted zero-, one-, and mul-
tiphoton events of Alice’s source, respectively. Analo-
gously, the zero-, one- and multi-photon error rates, e0,
e1 and eM, are defined as the error rates conditioned on
emitted zero-, one-, and multiphoton events, respectively.
The relation to the total quantum bit error rate (QBER)
E(s) is given by
Q(s)E(s) = e0Y0p
(s)
0 + e
(s)
1 Y
(s)
1 p
(s)
1 + e
(s)
M Y
(s)
M p
(s)
M . (3)
The QBER and the gain Q(s) are directly accessible from
the recorded data of the QKD protocol. However, since
Alice and Bob do not know when a single photon was
sent, they cannot determine the exact values of Y (s)1 and
e
(s)
1 , but need to estimate them using worst-case assump-
tions. Prior to the decoy method, they had to assume
that all multiphoton events produce a click at Bob’s de-
tector. This corresponds to Y (s)M = 1, and a lower bound
on Y (s)1 can be calculated with Equation (2). This esti-
mate, however, lies well below the single photon trans-
mission probability caused by natural losses. In addition,
Alice and Bob have to assume that all errors arise from
single photon events, resulting in a very high estimate of
e
(s)
1 . These values are actually achieved if Eve performs
a photon number splitting (PNS) attack [8, 9, 10], and
lead to a drastically reduced key rate [7].
The decoy method enables Alice and Bob to attain
better estimates of Y (s)1 and e
(s)
1 . This is achieved by
randomly introducing “decoy” states with independent
photon number distributions. For each photon number
distribution, the gain and QBER can be determined in-
dividually, resulting in better bounds on Y (s)1 and e
(s)
1 .
In this paper, we base our analysis on the so-called
vacuum+weak decoy method [13, 14], which uses two de-
coy states. Deliberately interspersing the signal stream
with vacuum states (pn = δn0, gain Q = Y0) allows Al-
ice and Bob to determine the dark count probability Y0.
The second decoy state is of low intensity and features
a photon number distribution p(d)n that differs from the
photon number distribution p(s)n of the regular signal. In
the following, we will refer to this state as the decoy state,
and to the state with photon number distribution p(s)n as
the signal state. The gain for the decoy state is given by
Q(d) = Y0p
(d)
0 + Y
(d)
1 p
(d)
1 + Y
(d)
M p
(d)
M , (4)
with the yields defined equivalently to the signal yields.
The yield Y0 for an emitted zero-photon state has to be
the same for all states because Eve cannot distinguish
between vacua arising from different states. However,
there is no a priori reason for the single- and multiphoton
yields to be the same for signal and decoy. In the analyses
up to now, it was assumed that Eve cannot distinguish
between n-photon events arising from signal and decoy
state, resulting in Y (s)n = Y
(d)
n (n ∈ N0). Note that
this is the assumption we will loosen in Section IV, as it
is generally not justified in a multi-mode description of
the states. However, proceeding with Y (s)n = Y
(d)
n , from
Equations (2) and (4) the lower bound
Y1,LB =
p
(s)
2
p
(s)
2 p
(d)
1 − p(s)1 p(d)2
×(
Q(d) − p
(d)
2
p
(s)
2
Q(s) − p
(s)
2 p
(d)
0 − p(s)0 p(d)2
p
(s)
2
Y0
)
(5)
on the signal single photon yield can be derived if the
additional condition
Y
(d)
M
Y
(s)
M
≤ p
(d)
2 /p
(d)
M
p
(s)
2 /p
(s)
M
(6)
is satisfied. This is, for instance, fulfilled if both signal
and decoy have a Poissonian or thermal distribution with
a lower mean photon number for the decoy distribution.
With a similar Equation to (3) for the decoy QBER
(i.e., (.)(s) → (.)(d)), an upper bound on the single photon
error rate of the decoy state can be calculated as
e
(d)
1 ≤ e(d)1,ub =
1
p
(d)
1 Y
(d)
1,LB
[
E(d)Q(d) − e0Y0p(d)0
]
. (7)
The postulated indistinguishability of n-photon states for
signal and decoy gives e(s)1,ub = e
(d)
1,ub and Y
(d)
1,LB = Y
(s)
1,LB,
because Y (d)1 = Y
(s)
1 , and e0 = 1/2, since a dark count
gives the wrong result 50% of the time.
The derived bounds, Equations (5) and (7), are much
tighter than the worst case assumptions without decoy
states. Therefore using them in Equation (1) results in a
significant improvement in the achievable secure key rate
[12].
III. THE MULTI-MODE STATE
QKD analyses generally assume that Alice’s output
states are accurately represented by a single-mode de-
3scription as
ρ(s/d) =
∑
n
p(s/d)(n) |n〉 〈n| , (8)
where p(s/d)(n) denotes the signal and decoy photon num-
ber distributions.
This form intrinsically implies that all emitted pho-
tons have identical properties, in particular they are all
excited into the same spectral mode. This appears as an
appropriate modeling for weak coherent pulses emitted
by a laser as multi-mode effects can be expected to be less
critical. However, designing a PDC source with single-
mode emission is a complex task, as it requires two out-
put beams with independent spatio-spectral mode struc-
tures [17].
A type-II PDC process emits photons in two different
polarization modes, called signal and idler. The pho-
ton numbers in signal and idler modes are strictly corre-
lated. If PDC sources are used in ”prepare and mea-
sure” QKD protocols, only the photons of the signal
mode are employed for information encoding. Describ-
ing the PDC output state in a single-mode description
as |Ψ(s/d)〉 = ∑n c(s/d)(n) |n〉s |n〉i, we can obtain signal
states of the form of Equation (8) by tracing over the
idler mode.
A more realistic model of the PDC output state has to
account for the multi-mode structure as follows [15]:
|Ψ(s/d)〉 =
N⊗
k=1
∑
n
c(s/d)(k, n) |n, ξk〉s |n, ζk〉i (9)
with
|n, ξk〉s =
1√
n!
(
A†s,ξk
)n
|0〉 , (10)
A†s,ξk ≡
∫
dωξk(ω)a†s(ω). (11)
Equation (10) describes a state with n photons in the
spectral mode ξk(ω). Here ξk(ω) is a set of orthonor-
mal functions, therefore the orthonormality condition
〈n, ξi|m, ξj〉 = δnmδij holds. For a detailed description
of this notation, see [18]. Note that we consider only one
spatial mode in Equation (9), which can be achieved by
using a single mode fiber. The following analysis, how-
ever, does not depend on the mode type and thus can also
be applied to states with more than one spatial mode.
Tracing out the idler mode gives the state
ρ(s/d) =
N⊗
k=1
∑
n
p(s/d)(k, n) |n; ξk〉 〈n; ξk| (12)
with p(s/d)(k, n) = |c(s/d)(k, n)|2 =
sech2 r(s/d)k tanh
2n r
(s/d)
k in the signal arm [15]. Here the
squeezing parameter r(s/d)k ∝
√
I(s/d) is proportional to
the square root of the pump intensity. Hence, if signal
and decoy states are created by pumping the crystal with
different intensities, the mode distributions for signal
and decoy states will be different and our multi-mode
treatment becomes essential.
In our numerical simulations, Section VI, we will re-
turn to investigating the PDC state to illustrate the
multi-mode effects in decoy-based QKD systems. Note,
however, that the following analysis applies to all states
of the form (12) and is by no means restricted to a PDC
source or spectral modes.
IV. NEW BOUND ON Y
(s)
1
Recall that in a single mode description, the yields for
n-photon signal and decoy states are identical and thus
a lower bound on Y (s)1 can be computed by Equation (5)
from the known gains and photon number distributions.
In this section, we develop a means of computing a
lower bound on Y (s)1 for multi-mode states as defined in
Equation (12). For states of this type, Y (s)n = Y
(d)
n is no
longer valid for n ≥ 1. Note, however, that Y0 is still the
same for signal and decoys, because for zero emitted pho-
tons the resulting state is always described by the same
vacuum state and thus Eve cannot treat these pulses dif-
ferently for signal and decoys. The derivation of the new
lower bound on Y (s)1 proceeds in three steps. First, we
derive a lower bound on the signal single-photon yield
Y
(s)
1 for a given decoy single-photon yield Y
(d)
1 . Then,
we determine an upper bound on the decoy multiphoton
yield Y (d)M for a given signal multiphoton yield Y
(s)
M . Fi-
nally, with these two relations, we are able to calculate
a lower bound on Y (s)1 for given signal and decoy gains,
Q(s) and Q(d).
Step 1 - Lower bound on Y (s)1 for a given Y
(d)
1 :
Assume Eve has to let a certain fraction Y (d)1 of the decoy
single-photon events pass to achieve the desired decoy
gain. In this step, we are seeking the lowest possible value
for the signal single-photon yield Y (s)1 that is compatible
with the given Y (d)1 . Using Equation (12), we find the
conditioned one-photon state to be
ρ
(s/d)
1 =
∑
k
m
(s/d)
k |1; ξk〉 〈1; ξk| , (13)
where we define the mode occupation probabilities by
m
(s/d)
k =
p(s/d)(k, 1)
∏
i 6=k p
(s/d)(i, 0)
P
(s/d)
1
, (14)
and the single-photon probability is given by
P
(s/d)
1 =
∑
k
p(s/d)(k, 1)
∏
i 6=k
p(s/d)(i, 0). (15)
We have to assume that Alice does not have the technol-
ogy to determine in which mode a photon resides. Re-
member that she cannot even determine the total number
4FIG. 1: (Color online) Eve blocks all photons in the second
mode. This results in different single-photon yields for signal
and decoy state.
of emitted photons for a given event. However, an appa-
ratus that measures the number of photons in each mode
individually is possible in principle, because all modes
are orthogonal. Therefore, if we want to claim uncon-
ditional security, we have to give Eve knowledge about
how many photons each mode contains. For the single-
photon case, this means that she knows in which mode
the photon is. This, in turn, allows Eve to reach different
single-photon yields for signals and decoys by selectively
blocking modes if the mode occupation probabilities mk
differ for signal and decoy state.
Figure 1 illustrates how this can be accomplished for
the case of two different modes with m(d)1 = 0.7, m
(d)
2 =
0.3, m(s)1 = 0.6 and m
(s)
2 = 0.4. If Eve blocks all pho-
tons in the second mode, 70% of the decoy single-photons
event are transmitted, but only 60% of the signal single-
photons pass through the channel. This results in the
yields Y (s)1 = 0.6 and Y
(d)
1 = 0.7.
For a given decoy single-photon yield Y (d)1 , we denote
the smallest possible value Eve can achieve for Y (s)1 as
Y
(s)
1,lb
(
Y
(d)
1
)
. In our example above, we have Y (s)1,lb = 6/7 ·
Y
(d)
1 for Y
(d)
1 ≤ 0.7, because in this case the photons of
the first mode are sufficient to reach Y (d)1 . Thus Eve can
completely block the second mode and let only photons
of the first mode pass. For Y (d)1 > 0.7, Eve additionally
has to let a fraction (Y (d)1 − 0.7)/0.3 of the photons in
the second mode pass to reach Y (d)1 , resulting in Y
(s)
1,lb =
0.6 + (Y (d)1 − 0.7)/0.3 · 0.4.
This concept is easily extended to all N modes that
contribute to the state of Equation (13). Without loss
of generality, we take m(d)1 /m
(s)
1 ≥ m(d)2 /m(s)2 ≥ . . . ≥
m
(d)
N /m
(s)
N . Only letting photons from the first mode pass
results in the smallest ratio between Y (s)1 and Y
(d)
1 , but
this is only possible if Y (d)1 ≤ m(d)1 . Otherwise, addi-
tional photons from other modes are needed to achieve
the desired Y (d)1 . The number K of required modes is
implicitly defined by
K−1∑
k=1
m
(d)
k ≤ Y (d)1 <
K∑
k=1
m
(d)
k , (16)
such that both inequalities hold. Eve can achieve
the lowest possible value for Y (s)1 by letting all pho-
tons of the first K − 1 modes, and a fraction(
Y
(d)
1 −
∑K−1
k=1 m
(d)
k
)
/m
(d)
K of the photons in the Kth
mode pass. This gives the desired value for the decoy
single-photon yield
Y
(d)
1 =
K−1∑
k=1
m
(d)
k +
Y
(d)
1 −
∑K−1
k=1 m
(d)
k
m
(d)
K
m
(d)
K , (17)
and the lower bound
Y
(s)
1,lb
(
Y
(d)
1
)
=
K−1∑
k=1
m
(s)
k +
Y
(d)
1 −
∑K−1
k=1 m
(d)
k
m
(d)
K
m
(s)
K (18)
for the signal single-photon yield for a given Y (d)1 .
Step 2 - Upper bound on Y (d)M for a given Y
(s)
M :
In this step, we want to find the highest possible decoy
multiphoton yield that is compatible with a given signal
multiphoton yield. With minor modifications, this works
out analogously to step 1, the only difference being that
we have to keep track of all possible distributions of the
photons among the modes. For this purpose, we intro-
duce the set Q = {l ∈ NN0 |
∑N
k=1 lk ≥ 2}. Each member
of this set represents a multiphoton event with li photons
in the ith mode.
Similarly to mk for the single-photon case, we define
hl as the probability that a multiphoton event possesses
the photon distribution specified by l ∈ Q. It is given by
h
(s/d)
l =
1
P
(s/d)
M
N∏
k=1
p(s/d)(k, lk) (19)
with the multiphoton probability
P
(s/d)
M =
∑
n≥2
P
(s/d)
2 = 1− P (s/d)0 − P (s/d)1 , (20)
where P (s/d)n denotes the convoluted photon number
distribution of all modes. Accordingly, P (s/d)0 =∏N
k=1 p
(s/d)(k, 0) and P (s/d)1 is given by Equation (15).
Employing the mode distribution probabilities of Equa-
tion (19), the states of Equation (12) conditioned on a
multiphoton event can be written as
ρ
(s/d)
M =
∑
l∈Q
h
(s/d)
l
N⊗
k=1
|lk; ξk〉 〈lk; ξk| . (21)
Again, Eve is not only allowed to make a photon num-
ber measurement but can also determine the mode dis-
tribution l of a multiphoton event. Thus she can selec-
tively block multiphoton events with certain mode dis-
tributions. The highest possible Y (d)M for a given Y
(s)
M is
achieved if Eve lets only events with the highest ratio
between h(d)l and h
(s)
l pass. To sort the mode distribu-
tions accordingly, we define L1 = argmaxL∈Q h
(d)
L /h
(s)
L
5and recursively
Li = argmax
L∈Q\{L1,...,Li−1}
h
(d)
L
h
(s)
L
for i ≥ 2. (22)
With that definition, we can apply the same method as
in step 1. For a given Y (s)M , we define K implicitly by
K−1∑
i=1
h
(s)
Li
≤ Y (s)M <
K∑
i=1
h
(s)
Li
. (23)
The highest possible Y (d)M , compatible with a given
Y
(s)
M , is achieved if all multiphoton events with mode
distributions L1 to LK−1, and the remaining fraction(
Y
(s)
M −
∑K−1
i=1 h
(s)
Li
)
/hLK with mode distribution LK
are transmitted to Bob’s side. As a result we have the
upper bound
Y
(d)
M,ub(Y
(s)
M ) =
K−1∑
i=1
h
(d)
Li
+
Y
(s)
M −
∑K−1
i=1 h
(s)
Li
h
(s)
LK
h
(d)
LK
(24)
on the decoy multiphoton yield Y (d)M for a given signal
multiphoton yield Y (s)M .
Step 3 - The new bound on Y (s)1 for given gains
Q(s) and Q(d): With the derived relations between the
yields of signal and idler events, we are now able to calcu-
late a new lower bound on Y (s)1 for given signal and decoy
gains. If the relations were just given by a constant ratio,
this would be in direct analogy to the single-mode case
where the ratio of signal and decoy yields was fixed. This
means we could plug the relations into Equation (4) and
solve Equations (2) and (4) for a lower bound on Y (s)1 .
However, the derived relations, Equations (18) and (24),
do not have a simple functional form. Hence an iterative
approach is required to determine the new lower bound
on Y (s)1 .
We first solve Equations (2) and (4) for Y (s)M and Y
(d)
1 ,
respectively:
Y
(s)
M =
1
P
(s)
M
[
Q(s) − P (s)0 Y0 − P (s)1 Y (s)1
]
, (25)
Y
(d)
1 =
1
P
(d)
1
[
Q(d) − P (d)0 Y0 − P (d)M Y (d)M
]
. (26)
Alice and Bob know Y0 from the vacuum decoy state.
They can measure Q(s) and Q(d), and they know P0, P1
and PM for both signal and decoy because they know
the properties of their source. In addition, a trivial lower
bound on Y (s)1 is given by Y
(s)
1 ≥ Y (s)1,LB = 0. Starting
with that value, a tighter bound can be calculated by
the following algorithm:
1. Start by calculating an upper bound on Y (s)M from
Y
(s)
1,LB, using Equation (25):
Y
(s)
M,UB =
1
P
(s)
M
[
Q(s) − P (s)0 Y0 − P (s)1 Y (s)1,LB
]
(27)
2. Next, use Y (s)M,UB to derive an upper bound on Y
(d)
M
with Equation (24)
Y
(d)
M,UB = Y
(d)
M,ub
(
Y
(s)
M,UB
)
(28)
3. Obtain a lower bound on Y (d)1 from Y
(d)
M,UB with
Equation (26):
Y
(d)
1,LB =
1
P
(d)
1
[
Q(d) − P (d)0 Y0 − P (d)M Y (d)M,UB
]
(29)
4. Finally, determine a lower bound on Y (s)1 from
Y
(d)
1,LB, using Equation (18)
Y
(s)
1,LB = Y
(s)
1,lb
(
Y
(d)
1,LB
)
(30)
The value obtained in Equation (30) can iteratively be
plugged into the previously described steps as initial
value, which results in an even tighter bound. After each
iteration step, the final value for Y (s)1,LB is at least as large
as the starting value, so the iteratively obtained values
are monotonically increasing. As Y (s)1,LB ≤ 1 is bounded
from above (not more than 100% of the events can result
in a click of Bob’s detector), the series converges, giving
the final lower bound on the single-photon yield of the
signal state.
V. NEW BOUND ON e
(s)
1
We also need to bound the error rate of the single-
photon events of the signal state from above. In this case,
Eve wants to introduce as many errors as possible into
the single-photon events of the signal state while leaving
the measured QBERs as expected, because this way she
can gain the maximal amount of information from the
signal single-photon events. An upper bound on the de-
coy single-photon events is given by Equation (7) if we
use Y (d)1,LB given by the value (29) obtained in the iteration
for determining Y (s)1,LB. Since the errors also have to be as-
sumed to be under Eve’s control, she is free to choose the
modes into which the errors occur. The highest error rate
of the signal single-photon events compared to the error
rate of the decoy single-photon events is obtained if the
errors are introduced into modes with a large m(s)k /m
(d)
k
ratio. Hence, if we again define K implicitly by
N∑
k=K
m
(d)
k ≤ e(d)1,ub <
N∑
i=K−1
m
(d)
k , (31)
the worst case assumption is that all pho-
tons in modes N,N − 1, . . . ,K and a fraction(
e
(d)
1,ub −
∑N
k=K m
(d)
k
)
/m
(d)
K−1 of the photons in mode
6K − 1 are erroneous. This gives the new upper bound
on the signal single-photon error rate,
e
(s)
1,ub =
N∑
k=K
m
(s)
k +
e
(d)
1,ub −
∑N
k=K m
(d)
k
m
(d)
K−1
m
(s)
K−1. (32)
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
With the new lower bound on Y (s)1 , obtained by Equa-
tion (30) in the iteration, and the new upper bound on
e
(s)
1 given by Equation (32), we can determine a lower
bound on the achievable key rate for states of the form
(12) with Equation (1).
In the following simulations, we consider the simplest
example for the use of a PDC source in a QKD protocol.
Signal and decoy states are created with different pump
intensities, and only the photons in the signal mode are
used for information encoding, while the photons in the
idler mode are ignored. The PDC output state is modeled
with a full multimode structure and is given by Equation
(9), resulting in the state (12) after tracing over the idler
mode. The photon number distribution for each spectral
mode is given by
p(s/d)(k, n) = sech2 r(s/d)k tanh
2n r
(s/d)
k , (33)
with r(s/d)k ∝ λk
√
I(s/d) describing the corresponding
squeezing parameters. I(s) and I(d) are the pump inten-
sities for signal and decoy state, respectively, and λk in-
dicates how prominent the kth mode is. The coefficients
λk are properties of the PDC crystal and the pump.
The photon number distribution for each spectral
mode, Equation (33), is a thermal distribution. Thus the
single-mode case (λk = δk1) corresponds to thermal pho-
ton number distribution. With more contributing modes,
the distribution is changed from thermal towards a Pois-
sonian distribution. This is shown in Figure 2 for the
values of Table I and a mean photon number of 0.6.
Let us first illustrate, by means of a simple example,
how different mode occupation probabilities arise for sig-
nal and decoy state. Consider a PDC state with just two
spectral modes that have λ1 =
√
0.75 and λ2 =
√
0.25.
The mode occupation probabilities for a single-photon
event are then given by
m1(I) =
p(1, 1)p(2, 0)
p(1, 1)p(2, 0) + p(1, 0)p(2, 1)
=
tanh2 r1
tanh2 r1 + tanh2 r2
, (34)
m2(I) =
tanh2 r2
tanh2 r1 + tanh2 r2
. (35)
They inherit the intensity dependence from the squeez-
ing parameters r1 and r2. This intensity dependence is
shown in Figure 3, along with chosen decoy and signal
Width σ λk
1 nm 0.959, 0.194, 0.152, 0.098, 0.088, 0.033, 0.032, 0.014
2 nm 0.871, 0.463, 0.140, 0.064, 0.054, 0.028, 0.001
4 nm 0.690, 0.555, 0.383, 0.222, 0.107, 0.054, 0.050, 0.044,
0.023, 0.012, 0.004, 0.003, 0.001
8 nm 0.511, 0.478, 0.427, 0.364, 0.296, 0.228, 0.167, 0.117,
0.078, 0.056, 0.047, 0.037, 0.023, 0.015, 0.014, 0.011,
0.006, 0.003, 0.001
TABLE I: λk for the KTP crystal for different pump widths.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The photon number distributions for
different pump widths σ.
intensities such that we end up exactly with the states
shown in Figure 1.
Now, we focus on a physically realistic case. Our source
is a waveguided periodically poled KTP crystal with a
grating period of Λ = 68.40µm, length of 5 mm, and
waveguide width and height both 4 µm. The pump laser
spectrum is centered at a wavelength of 775nm and the
signal and idler are frequency degenerate around 1550nm.
We study four different pump bandwidths σ, which lead
to different values for λk [15]. They are shown in Table I.
We first consider the case of σ = 4nm. For given pump
intensities for signal and decoy state, the mode occupa-
tion probabilities can be calculated with Equations (14)
and (19) for the single-photon and multiphoton state, re-
spectively. We assume that Eve designs her attack such
that her presence cannot be detected. This implies that
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The mode occupation probabilities m1
and m2 for a single-photon event in dependence of the pump
intensity.
7the measured gains and error rates for signal and de-
coy state have the values that are expected from natural
losses and detection errors. According to [12], they are
given by
Q(s/d) =
∑
n
YnP
(s/d)
n , (36)
E(s/d) =
1
Q(s/d)
∑
n
enYnP
(s/d)
n , (37)
with the overall (i.e., convoluted) photon number distri-
butions P (s/d)n and
Yn ≈ ηn + pdark, (38)
en =
1
Yn
(
edetηn +
1
2
pdark
)
. (39)
In these equations, pdark is the dark count probability
of Bob’s detector, edet is the detection error (i.e., the
probability that Alice prepares a 0 (1), but Bob detects a
1 (0)), and ηn = 1−(1−η)n is the probability that at least
one of n photons arrives at Bob’s side and is detected.
The overall detection probability η = 10−α/10 · ηdet of
each photon is determined by the channel attenuation
α in dB and the detector efficiency ηdet. We use the
experimental parameters of Ref. [19] in the simulations,
which are shown in Table II.
Dark count probability 1.7 · 10−6
Detection error 3.3%
Detector efficiency 4.5%
TABLE II: Characteristics of Bob’s detector.
With the gains and QBER for signal and decoy states,
Equations (38) and (39), a lower bound on the signal
single-photon yield Y (s)1 , and an upper bound on the sig-
nal single-photon error rate e(s)1 can be calculated as de-
scribed in Sections IV and V. This allows us to compute
a lower bound on the achievable key rate according to
Equation (1). We compare this key rate to the key rate
for a single-mode source with the same photon number
distribution. In other words, the secure key rate one
would falsely expect to be achievable if the multi-mode
structure of the PDC state is ignored. It is calculated by
Equation (1) with the bounds on Y (s)1 and e
(s)
1 given by
Equations (5) and (7). The corresponding key rates are
both plotted in Figure 4 against the channel attenuation.
We find that the key rate drops about 10% when Eve’s
new possible attack is taken into account by adjusting the
bounds on Y (s)1 and e
(s)
1 accordingly. In both scenarios,
the mean photon number of the decoy state is 0.1, and
the mean photon number of the signal state is optimized
to give the highest key rate.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Solid (red) line: Lower bound on the
secure key rate for the KTP crystal with a pump width of 4
nm. Dashed (green) line: Lower bound on secure key rate for
the same photon number distribution, but with all photons in
the same spectral mode. The inset shows a zoom of the 50-
55km region. The weak decoy mean photon number is 0.1 in
both cases, and the signal mean photon number is optimized
to result in the largest possible rate.
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for different pump width and therefore different mode contri-
butions. The asymptotic cases are the rates for thermal and
Poissonian distribution. The inset shows the optimized mean
photon number of the signal state. The weak decoy mean
photon number is fixed to 0.1 for all scenarios.
Figure 5 shows the secure key rate for all different
pump widths given in Table I. One can see that the secure
key rate is higher when more modes contribute to the
PDC process. This effect is explained by the change in
the photon number distribution. With more contributing
modes, the photon number distribution is shifted from
a thermal distribution to a Poissonian distribution (see
Figure 2). The Poissonian distribution is favorable in
comparison to the thermal distribution, because the ratio
between single-photon and multiphoton events increases.
This permits a higher mean photon number for the signal
8state, which in turn increases the achievable key rate and
distance. The resulting optimal mean photon numbers in
dependence of the channel attenuation are depicted in the
inset of Figure 5.
VII. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have pointed out the necessity to care-
fully pay attention to the output states of the utilized
sources, but likewise demonstrated that the demand for
perfect indistinguishability of the signal and decoy pho-
tons, which is hard to implement in practice, can be loos-
ened for only a small cost in the key rate.
The analysis was applied to a parametric down conver-
sion (PDC) source, where the weak decoy state is created
by pumping the crystal with a lower pump intensity. For
about ten effectively contributing modes, we observed a
drop of the key rate to roughly 90% of the correspond-
ing value in the single-mode case with the same photon
number distribution. The simulation was performed for
different numbers of effectively contributing modes, lead-
ing to the conclusion that the advantageous change in the
photon number distribution, which occurs if more modes
contribute has a higher effect on the key rate than the
aforementioned decrease due to the new attack possibil-
ity presented to Eve by the multi-mode structure of the
states.
This analysis can also be used for a heralded PDC
source, as long as the heralding detector is frequency in-
dependent, as the resulting states are also of the form
of Equation (12). For heralding with a frequency de-
pendent detector, the analysis has to be extended to the
case where the density matrices for signal and decoy state
are diagonal in different bases, contrary to our condition
given by Equation (12).
Another possibility to produce the decoy state is by
passive decoy generation [20, 21]. In this scheme, the
complications that arise because of the multi-mode struc-
ture of the PDC state can be avoided if a frequency inde-
pendent detector is available for the decoy generation, as
the spectral properties of n-photon states would then be
the same for signal and decoy state. This, however, is not
the case for a frequency dependent detector, because such
a detector leads to signal and decoy states with different
spectral properties. Again, the resulting states require
an analysis for signal and decoy states that are diagonal
in different bases.
We believe that this paper is a first step towards al-
lowing more general signal and decoy states, which will
significantly simplify the design of QKD sources.
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